[N.B.: The following reflects what the author submitted, and not exactly
what was published. To obtain the precise text of what was printed, please check
the original place of publication.]
In early February 1995, newspapers around the world featured a photograph taken
in Cairo, which showed, for the first time ever, the prime minister of Israel
standing side-by-side with the king of Jordan, the chairman of the Palestine
Liberation Organization, and the president of Egypt.
These gentlemen ostensibly met to discuss the faltering peace process between
the Arabs and Israel. Yet this unprecedented event of an Israeli leader in
conclave with Arab colleagues sent another signal too: four leaders who share a
common problem-fundamentalist Islam-are ready to work together. According to one
account of the meeting, Rabin said that Israelis are the target of the
fundamentalist attacks. Arafat jumped in and said, "Me too. They have threatened
my life." At that point, Mubarak and Husayn both nodded their heads and said
they too had personally been threatened by the radicals.
The photograph neatly symbolizes a great shift now taking place in Middle
Eastern politics. Arab-Israeli issues remain formally the main item on the
agenda but fundamentalist violence has become the greatest worry of nearly every
government in the region. This shift marks a deep transformation for the Middle
East. Through six decades, a politician's stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict
defined more than anything else his standing in Middle East politics. No longer.
Now, his position on fundamentalism, the single greatest threat to the region,
primarily determines his allies and his enemies.
Why do Middle Eastern leaders feel so threatened by fundamentalist movements?
Are they perhaps exaggerating the threat? And how is the U.S. government dealing
with this novel issue?
A Variety of Threats
Though anchored in religious creed, fundamentalist Islam is a radical utopian
movement closer in spirit to other such movements (communism, fascism) than to
traditional religion. By nature anti-democratic and aggressive, anti-Semitic and
anti-Western, it has great plans. Indeed, spokesmen for fundamentalist Islam see
their movement standing in direct competition to Western civilization and
challenging it for global supremacy. Let's look at each of these elements in
more detail.
Radical utopian schema. Outside their own movement, fundamentalists see
every existing political system in the Muslim world as deeply compromised,
corrupt, and mendacious. As one of their spokesmen put it as long ago as 1951,
"there is no [sic] one town in the whole world where Islam is observed as
enjoined by Allah, whether in politics, economics or social matters." Implied
here is that Muslims true to God's message must reject the status quo and build
wholly new institutions.
To build a new Muslim society, fundamentalists proclaim their intent to do
whatever they must; they openly flaunt an extremist sensibility. "There are no
such terms as compromise and surrender in the Islamic cultural lexicon," a
spokesman for Hamas declares. If that means destruction and death for the
enemies of true Islam, so be it. Hizbullah's spiritual leader, Muhammad Husayn
Fadlallah, concurs: "As Islamists," he says, "we seek to revive the Islamic
inclination by all means possible."
Seeing Islam as the basis of a political system touching every aspect of life,
fundamentalists are totalitarian. Whatever the problem, "Islam is the solution."
In their hands, Islam is transformed from a personal faith into a ruling system
that knows no constraints. They scrutinize the Qur'an and other texts for hints
about Islamic medicine, Islamic economics, and Islamic statecraft, all with an
eye to creating a total system for adherents and corresponding total power for
leaders. Fundamentalists are revolutionary in outlook, extremist in behavior,
totalitarian in ambition.
Revealingly, they vaunt Islam as the best ideology, not the best
religion-thereby exposing their focus on power. Whereas a traditional Muslim
would say something like, "We are not Jewish, we are not Christian, we are
Muslim," the Malaysian Islamist leader Anwar Ibrahim made a very different
comparison: "We are not socialist, we are not capitalist, we are Islamic." While
fundamentalist Islam differs in its details from other utopian ideologies, it
closely resembles them in scope and ambition. Like communism and fascism, it
offers a vanguard ideology; a complete program to improve man and create a new
society; complete control over that society; and cadres ready, even eager, to
spill blood.
Anti-democratic. Like Hitler and Allende, who exploited the democratic
process to reach power, the fundamentalists are actively taking part in
elections; like the earlier figures, too, they have done dismayingly well.
Fundamentalists swept municipal elections in Algeria in 1990 and won the
mayoralties of Istanbul and Ankara in 1994. They have had success in the
Lebanese and Jordanian elections and should win a substantial vote in the West
Bank and Gaza, should Palestinian elections be held.
Once in power, would they remain democrats? There is not a lot of hard evidence
on this point, Iran being the only case at hand where fundamentalists in power
have made promises about democracy. (In all other fundamentalist
regimes-Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Sudan-military leaders have dominated.)
Ayatollah Khomeini promised real democracy (an assembly "based on the votes of
the people") as he took power. Once in charge, he partially fulfilled this
pledge: Iran's elections are hotly disputed and parliament does have real
authority. But there's an important catch: parliamentarians must subscribe to
the principles of the Islamic revolution. Only candidates (including
non-Muslims) who subscribe to the official ideology may run for office. The
regime in Tehran thus fails the key test of democracy, for it cannot be voted
out of power.
Judging by their statements, other fundamentalists are likely to offer even less
democracy than the Iranians. Indeed, statements by fundamentalist spokesmen from
widely dispersed countries suggest an open disdain for popular sovereignty.
Ahmad Nawfal, a Muslim Brother from Jordan, says that "If we have a choice
between democracy and dictatorship, we choose democracy. But if it's between
Islam and democracy, we choose Islam." Hadi Hawang of PAS in Malaysia makes the
same point more bluntly: "I am not interested in democracy, Islam is not
democracy, Islam is Islam." Or, in the famous (if not completely verified) words
of 'Ali Belhadj, a leader of Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), "When we
are in power, there will be no more elections because God will be ruling."
Anti-moderate. Fundamentalist Islam is also aggressive. Like other
revolutionaries, very soon after taking power fundamentalists try to expand at
the expense of neighbors. The Khomeinists almost immediately sought to overthrow
moderate (meaning here, non-fundamentalist) Muslim regimes in Bahrain and Egypt.
For six years (1982-88) after Saddam Husayn wanted to quit, they kept the war
going against Iraq; and they occupied three small but strategic islands in the
Persian Gulf near the Straits of Hormuz. The Iranian terrorist campaign is now
fifteen years old and reaches from the Philippines to Argentina. The mullahs are
building an arsenal that includes missiles, submarines, and the infrastructure
for unconventional weaponry. In like spirit, Afghan fundamentalists have invaded
Tajikistan. Their Sudanese counterparts reignited the civil war against
Christians and animists in the south and, for good measure, stirred up trouble
at Halayib, a disputed territory on Sudan's border with Egypt.
So aggressive are fundamentalists that they attack neighbors even before taking
power. In early February of this year, as Algeria's FIS was fighting to survive,
some of its members assaulted a police outpost along the Tunisian border,
killing six officers and seizing their weapons.
Anti-Semitic. Consistent with Hannah Arendt's observation about
totalitarian movements necessarily being anti-Semitic, fundamentalist Muslims
bristle with hostility to Jews. They accept virtually every Christian myth about
Jews seeking control of the world, then add their own twist about Jews
destroying Islam. The Hamas charter sees Jews as the ultimate enemy: they
have used their wealth to gain control of the world media, news agencies, the press, broadcasting stations, etc.... They were behind the French revolution and the Communist revolution.... They instigated World War I.... They caused World War II.... It was they who gave the instructions to establish the United Nations and the Security Council to replace the League of Nations, in order to rule over the world through them.
Fundamentalists discuss Jews with the most violent and crude metaphors.
Khalil Kuka, a founder of Hamas, says that "God brought the Jews together in
Palestine not to benefit from a homeland but to dig their grave there and save
the world from their pollution." Tehran's ambassador to Turkey[MEF2] says that
"the Zionists are like the germs of cholera that will affect every person in
contact with them." Such venom is common coin in fundamentalist discourse.
Nor is violence confined to words. Especially since the September 1993 White
House signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles, Hamas and Islamic
Jihad have repeatedly targeted Israelis and other Jews, killing some hundred and
fifty individuals.
Anti-Western. Unnoticed by most Westerners, war has been unilaterally
declared on Europe and the United States. Fundamentalists are responding to what
they see as a centuries-long conspiracy by the West to destroy Islam. Inspired
by a Crusader-style hatred of Islam and an imperialist greed for Muslim
resources, the West has for centuries tried to neuter Islam. It has done so by
luring Muslims away from Islam through both its vulgar culture (blue jeans,
hamburgers, television shows, rock music) and its somewhat higher culture
(fashion clothes, French cuisine, universities, classical music). In this
spirit, a Pakistani fundamentalist group recently deemed Michael Jackson and
Madonna "cultural terrorists" and called for the two Americans to be brought to
trial in Pakistan. As Bernard Lewis notes, "It is the Tempter, not the
Adversary, that Khomeini feared in America, the seduction and enticement of the
American way of life rather than the hostility of American power." Or, in
Khomeini's own words: "We are not afraid of economic sanctions or military
intervention. What we are afraid of is Western universities."
Fearful of Western culture's hold over their own people, fundamentalists respond
with vitriolic attacks denigrating Western civilization. It is crassly
materialist says 'Adil Husayn, a leading Egyptian writer, seeing man is seen "as
nothing but an animal whose major concern is to fill his belly." To dissuade
Muslims from Westernizing, they portray our way of life as a form of disease.
Kalim Saddiqui, the main Iranian polemicist in the West, deems Western
civilization "not a civilization but a sickness." And not just any sickness but
"a plague and a pestilence" Belhadj of Algeria's FIS ridicules Western
civilization as "syphilization."
Operationalizing this hatred, fundamentalist groups have since 1983 resorted to
anti-Western violence. Americans have been targeted in two bombings of the U.S.
embassy in Beirut, the Marines barracks in Beirut, the embassy in Kuwait, and
the World Trade Center. Lesser incidents include the killing of American
passengers on several airliners, many hostages seized in Lebanon, and several
fatal incidents on United States territory. We can only guess how many incidents
(like the plan to go after the Holland tunnel and other New York landmarks) were
foiled; or how many lie yet in store.
While the World Trade Center gang has pretty much held its tongue, a Tunisian
named Fouad Salah conveyed the views of this violent element. Convicted in 1992
of setting off bombs that killed thirteen Frenchmen in terrorist campaign during
1985-86, Salah addressed the judge handling his case: "I do not renounce my
fight against the West which assassinated the Prophet Muhammad.... We Muslims
should kill every last one of you [Westerners]." He is hardly alone in harboring
such sentiments.
Not willing to co-exist. Hatred against the West inspires a struggle with
it for cultural supremacy. Fundamentalists see the rivalry as cultural, not
military. "It is a struggle of cultures," a Muslim Brethren leader explains,
"not one between strong countries and weak countries. We are sure that the
Islamic culture will triumph." But how is this victory to be achieved? By
producing better music or coming up with a cure for cancer? Hardly, as Saddiqui,
the Iranian spokesman in London, vividly makes clear: "American GIs clutching
photos of their girl friends would be no match for the soldiers of Islam
clutching copies of the Qur'an and seeking shahadah [martyrdom]." Islam
will triumph, in other words, through will and steel.
Fundamentalists do not restrict their sights to the Muslim quintile of the
world's population but aspire to universal dominance. Saddiqui announces this
goal somewhat obliquely: "Deep down in its historical consciousness the West
also knows that the Islamic civilization will ultimately replace it as the
world's dominant civilization." Men of action share the same ambition. The gang
that bombed the World Trade Center had great plans. 'Umar 'Abd ar-Rahman, the
Egyptian sheikh who guides them, stands accused in a Manhattan court of
seditious conspiracy, that is, trying to overthrow the government of the United
States. However bizarre this sounds, it makes sense from 'Abd ar-Rahman's
perspective. As he sees it, the mujahidin in Afghanistan brought down the
Soviet Union; so, one down and one to go. Not understanding the robustness of a
mature democracy, 'Abd ar-Rahman apparently thought a campaign of terrorist
incidents would so unsettle Americans that he and his group could take over. A
Tehran newspaper hinted at how the scenario would unfold when it portrayed the
February 1993 explosion at the World Trade Center as proof that the U.S. economy
"is exceptionally vulnerable." More than that, the bombing "will have an adverse
effect on Clinton's plans to rein in the economy." Some fundamentalists, at
least, really do think they can take on the United States.
U.S. Policy: The Record
Mischief by fundamentalists on U.S. territory pales, however, in comparison to
the danger they pose in the Middle East; their seizure of power in just a few
cantons there would likely create a new political order in the region, with
disastrous consequences. Israel would probably face a return to its unhappy
condition of days past, beleaguered by terrorism and surrounded by enemy states.
Civil unrest in oil-producing regions could lead to a dramatic run-up in the
cost of energy. Rogue states, already numerous in the Middle East (Iran, Iraq,
Syria, Sudan, Libya) would multiply, leading to arms races, more international
terrorism, and wars, lots of wars. Massive refugee outflows to Europe could well
prompt a reactionary political turn that would greatly increase the already
worrying appeal of fascists such as Jean-Marie Le Pen, who won 15 percent of the
French vote in the recent presidential election.
What steps has the Clinton administration taken to protect Americans from such
prospects? On the plus side, it has made efforts to isolate and weaken Iran;
unfortunately, no other industrial power has agreed to commit itself in like
fashion, virtually negating the impact of U.S. sanctions. Washington has also
focused world attention on atrocities committed by the Sudanese regime.
But if the Clinton administration is sound on fundamentalists already in power,
it has terribly misguided ideas about fundamentalists in opposition. Rather than
oppose them, it has initiated dialogue with the Palestinian, Egyptian, and
Algerian movements, and perhaps others. Why meet with these groups? As President
Clinton, James Woolsey, Peter Tarnoff, Martin Indyk, and others have all
explained, American policy opposes terrorism, not fundamentalist Islam. Most
fundamentalists are decent people, serious individuals espousing (in the words
of Robert Pelletreau, assistant secretary of state for the Middle East) "a
renewed emphasis on traditional values." So long as a group has no connections
to violent activities, both we and its government should encourage it to pursue
the political process.
We are in combat only with the violent extremists, they say. Actually, look
closely and you'll see that these elements are not even good Muslims, but
criminals exploiting the faith for their own malign purposes. "Islamic extremism
uses religion to cover its ambitions," national security advisor Anthony Lake
has said. In other words, those who use violence in the name of Islam are not
just marginal to the fundamentalist movement; they are frauds whose activities
go against its praiseworthy aims.
This distinction between good and bad fundamentalist Muslims leads to an
important policy implication: that the U.S. government work with the former and
against the latter. Yes: even as fundamentalists accuse the United States and
Israel of the most horrible crimes and announce their hatred of us, the American
government decides that these are people with whom we can do business. Hence the
political relations with Hamas, Egypt's Muslim Brethren, and FIS.
This is poor judgment and leads to bad policy. It would seem that the U.S.
government has gotten some bad advice. Hence the hopeful political relations
with Hamas, Egypt's Muslim Brethren, and FIS. It would almost always be better
not to work with such groups, the only exceptions being those of dire necessity.
Bad Advice
In part, the blame for the misguided U.S. policy must fall on the shoulders of
the usual suspects-academic specialists. While in the usual course of events,
the Executive Branch tries not to rely on advice from outsiders, where it lacks
expertise it does turn to specialists for help. Islam is one such issue. Since
the Iranian revolution of 1978, diplomats have leaned on Iranists and
Islamicists to help them develop U.S. policy.
With almost a single voice, these specialists advise the government not to
worry. Some say the fundamentalist challenge has faded. The usually sensible
Fouad Ajami reports that "the pan-Islamic millennium has run its course; the
Islamic decade is over." Likewise, Olivier Roy, the influential French
specialist, announced in 1992 that "the Islamic revolution is behind us." Other
analysts go further and say it never posed any danger in the first place. John
Esposito, probably the most important of the academic advisors, published a book
dispelling the notion of an "Islamic threat." Leon Hadar, an Israeli associated
with the Cato Institute, dubs the whole topic of fundamentalist Islam a
"contrived threat."
Specialists posit at least two benefits to be gained from American dialogue with
the fundamentalists. First, they assume fundamentalists are bound to reach power
(an assumption no less dubious than like predictions a generation ago about the
inevitability of a socialist triumph) and counsel establishing early and
friendly relations with them. Second, the specialists present fundamentalist
Islam as an essentially democratic force that will help stabilize politics in
the region, and so deserve our support. Graham Fuller, formerly of the Central
Intelligence Agency and now at RAND, makes the case for fundamentalism as a
healthy development: it "is politically tamable... [and] represents ultimate
political progress toward greater democracy and popular government." The
Egyptian scholar Saad Eddin Ibrahim, actually goes so far as to suggest that
fundamentalists "may evolve into something akin to the Christian Democrats in
the West."
The trouble with all this is that the notion of good and bad fundamentalists has
no basis in fact. Yes, fundamentalist Muslim groups, ideologies, and tactics
differ from each other in many ways-Sunni and Shi'i, working through the system
and not, using violence and not-but every one of them is inherently extremist.
Fundamentalist groups have evolved a division of labor, with some seeking power
through politics and others through intimidation. In Turkey, for example, the
Nurcus and the Necmettin Erbakan's Refah Partisi accept the democratic process,
while the Süleymancïs and the Milli Görus do not. In Algeria, much evidence
points to FIS coordinating with the murderous Armed Islamic Group (GIA).
Non-fundamentalist Muslims understand that, by aspiring to create a new man and
a new society, all fundamentalists in the end must work to overthrow the
existing order. Non-fundamentalists know this because they have seen the gleam
in the eyes of fundamentalists, heard their rhetoric, fended off their
depredations, endured their murders. Deemed traitors, non-fundamentalists like
Salman Rushdie or Taslima Nasrin are first in the line of fire, even ahead of
Jews or Christians.
They tirelessly try to educate Westerners on the subject of fundamentalist
Islam, with dismayingly little response. As the militant Algeria secularist Saïd
Sadi explains: "A moderate Islamist is someone who does not have the means of
acting ruthlessly to seize power immediately." The pro-Western president of
Tunisia points out that the "final aim" of all fundamentalists is the same: "the
construction of a totalitarian, theocratic state." The outspoken Algerian
ambassador to Washington, Osmane Bencherif, echoes this sentiment: "It is
misguided policy to distinguish between moderate and extremist fundamentalists.
The goal of all is the same: to construct a pure Islamic state, which is bound
to be a theocracy and totalitarian." Perhaps the strongest statement comes from
Mohammad Mohaddessin, director of international relations for the People's
Mojahedin of Iran, a leading opposition force: "Moderate fundamentalists do not
exist.... It's like talking about a moderate Nazi."
Approaches to Fundamentalist Islam
If moderate fundamentalists do not exist, then the U.S. government needs a new
policy toward fundamentalist opposition groups. But before proposing specific
steps, three premises must be aired: the need to draw a distinction between
Islam and fundamentalist Islam; the burden on Americans to prove themselves; and
the reason why we should work with the Left against the Right.
Fundamentalist Islam is not Islam. It is necessary to distinguish between
Islam and fundamentalist Islam. Islam is an ancient faith and capacious
civilization; fundamentalist Islam a narrow, aggressive twentieth-century
ideological movement. Whatever one chooses to call the phenomenon-extremist
Islam, fundamentalist Islam, militant Islam, political Islam, radical Islam,
Islamism, Islamic revival-it is the problem, not Islam as such.
Distinguishing between Islam and fundamentalist Islam has two important
benefits. First, it permits the U.S. government to adopt a sensible attitude
toward both. A secular government cannot have an opinion on a religion,
especially when it is practiced by significant numbers of its own citizens. But
it most assuredly can have an opinion on an ideological movement that is hostile
to its interests and values. Second, this distinction makes it possible to ally
with non-fundamentalist Muslims. Many of them, including those quoted here, are
fearless speakers of truth. Their insights guide those of us outside the Islamic
faith; their courage inspires us; and-when the fundamentalists or their
apologists accuse us of being "anti-Islam"-their agreement legitimates us.
Prove will. Fundamentalists see the West, for all its apparent strength,
as weak-willed; it reminds them of the shah's regime in Iran-rich, vainglorious,
corrupt, and decayed. 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, the Iranian hard-liner, disdains
the United States as "a hollow paper tiger with no power or strength." To be
sure, it disposes of wealth and missiles, but these cannot stand up to faith and
resolve. Fundamentalists don't even bother to hide their contempt for Western
countries. Iran's Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, for example, publicly asserts "The
British today are on their death bed. Other Western countries too are in a
similar state."
Such contempt obliges the West to act even more strongly and decisively than
otherwise might be the case. Tough positions are needed both as an end in
themselves and to show that we are not the flabby degenerates of the
fundamentalist imagination. The U.S. government has to prove, however absurd it
may sound, that Americans are not weaklings addicted to pornography and drugs.
Quite the contrary, we are a healthy people, resolute and ready to protect
ourselves and our ideals. Fundamentalists are so enthralled by their own views
of the West that these simplistic points have to be made over and over again.
Soheib Bencheikh, a former fundamentalist himself, explains that the West must
give them some of their own medicine: "To fight the fundamentalists one has to
have been a bit so oneself."
Better the Left than the Right. Until five years ago, the Left had a
global network that threatened American interests, while the Right consisted of
isolated and mostly weak regimes. It incontrovertibly made sense to work with
the friendly tyrants of the Right against the Marxist-Leninist complex on the
Left. Since 1990, these roles have, roughly speaking, been reversed, especially
in the Muslim world. Today, the Left consists of the odd shipwreck of a regime:
the FLN (National Liberation Front) in Algeria or a General Dostam in
Afghanistan. These governments stand for no ideas or visions; their leaders
merely want to stay in power. However corrupt, however nasty, they pose fewer
dangers to the Middle East or to the United States than do their fundamentalist
counterparts. Further, as mere tyrannies, they have a better chance of evolving
in the right direction than do intensely ideological regimes.
Instead, it's the Right, made up mainly of fundamentalist Muslims, who have
built what Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel calls " an international
infrastructure." The network sends out practical aid; for example, the Iranians
are reliably said to provide arms, money, cadres, political counseling, military
training, diplomatic support, and intelligence to the Sudan. It also provides
important psychological support. Fundamentalists feel much stronger for being
part of a surging international alliance, somewhat as Marxist-Leninists did in
previous years. This new network, like that old one, has the United States of
America in its sights. For these reasons, the U.S. government should
now-carefully, intelligently, selectively-join with the Left against the Right
whenever circumstances suggest doing so.
What We Should Do
Turning to specific policy recommendations, the overriding goal of U.S. policy
must be to keep fundamentalist Muslims from seizing power. Once they take over,
as the mullahs in Tehran have so clearly shown, they will hold on tenaciously.
How, then, to keep the fundamentalists from taking power?
Do not engage in official or public dialogue. Dialogue sends signals that
undercut existing governments without bringing any gains. President Husni
Mubarak of Egypt counsels Washington along these lines. "To engage in dialogue
with radical fundamentalists is a waste of time. " Actually, it is worse than
that because it works both to legitimize fundamentalists and to confirm its
belief in Western weakness. The U.S. government ought not to talk to
fundamentalist groups, much less ally with them; meetings with Palestinian,
Egyptian, and Algeria fundamentalists should stop.
Do not appease. As a former CIA specialist on Iran notes, "fundamentalism
is a war fought primarily in Muslim imaginations. Private and collective dreams
are not amenable to negotiations." Like other totalitarians, fundamentalist
Muslims respond to appeasement by demanding more concessions. Saïd Sadi, the
Algerian secularist, advises his fellow countrymen not to give in to the
fundamentalists "because if we made the slightest concession, all our freedoms
would be threatened." Again, Mubarak has it right: "I can assure you," he says,
fundamentalist groups will "never be on good terms with the United States." A
change in foreign policy will not suffice because fundamentalists despise us not
for what we do but for who we are. Short of adopting their brand of Islam, there
is no hope of satisfying them.
Don't help fundamentalists. With the end of the Cold War, this goal
should be easier to achieve. To get Pakistani permission to arm the Afghan
mujahidin against Soviet forces in the 1980s, the CIA had disproportionately
to supply the fundamentalists. Washington did as bidden, and rightly so, for it
meant aligning with the lesser evil against the greater one. Now that
fundamentalism is the greater evil-or, at least, the more dynamic one-this
conundrum is less likely to arise. It's hard to imagine any scenario today in
which the U.S. government should help fundamentalists.
Press fundamentalist states to reduce aggressiveness. The West should
pressure fundamentalist states-Afghanistan, Iran, Sudan-to reduce their
aggressiveness and the aid they supply to ideological brethren in such countries
as Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, and Algeria as well as to Palestinians. The U.S.
government and its allies have a wide range of commercial and diplomatic tools
at their disposal with which to confront fundamentalist aggression, with a
military option always reserved in the background if needed.
Support those confronting fundamentalist Islam. Governments in combat
with the fundamentalists deserve U.S. help. We should stand by the
non-fundamentalists, even when that means accepting, within limits, strong-arm
tactics (Egypt, the PLO), the aborting of elections (in Algeria), and
deportations (Israel). It also means supporting Turkey in its conflict with Iran
and India against Pakistan on the Kashmir issue.
The same applies to institutions and individuals. As a curtain of silence and
terror comes down around them, non-fundamentalists in the Middle East are losing
their voice. To be celebrated by Americans would greatly boost their morale and
prestige; while funds from the U.S. Information Agency, the Agency for
International Development, and private sources would do much good. Again, this
means working with some less than Jeffersonian organizations, notably the
People's Mojahedin of Iran, despite the controversy that would probably arouse.
Urge gradual democratization. Finally, the U.S. government must be very
careful how it presses for democracy. Unfortunately, it's become common to
identify democracy with elections, leading to a single-minded emphasis on
elections, as an end in themselves. In fact, by "democracy" most Americans
include liberty; a large set of political precepts, not just a means to elect a
government.
Quick elections solve little. Often they make matters worse by strengthening
fundamentalist elements, these usually being the best organized and the
citizenry not being ready to make fully informed electoral decisions. Instead,
we should press for more modest goals: political participation, the rule of law
(including an independent judiciary), freedom of speech and religion, property
rights, minority rights, and the right to form voluntary organizations
(especially political parties). In short, we should urge the formation of a
civil society. Elections are not the start of the democratic process but its
capstone and finale, the signal that a civil society has indeed come into
existence. As Judith Miller of The New York Times summarizes the point,
we should encourage "Elections tomorrow and civil society today."
In the end, the ideological battle of the post-Cold War era instigated by
fundamentalist Islam will be decided by Muslims, not by Americans. The
fundamentalist challenge will succeed or fail depending on what they and their
non-fundamentalists opponents do. Still, Americans are important bystanders who
can take significant steps to help our natural allies against our inevitable
adversaries.
All material